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Professional Conduct. In re Long, 755 A.2d 828 (R.I. 2000).
When an attorney admitted to the Rhode Island Bar is disciplined
in another state for misconduct in that state, he may also be sanc-
tioned in Rhode Island under the Rules of Professional Conduct,
after having an opportunity to be heard by the court regarding any
claim that imposition of reciprocal discipline is unwarranted.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
There are two separate incidents of misconduct that led to the
instant case.' The first began in November 1989, when Peter Pie-
traszek (Pietraszek) retained Long to represent him with regard to
litigation concerning a real estate transaction.2 Long filed a com-
plaint in the courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on be-
half of Pietraszek in October 1991, but failed to serve the
defendants in that case within the required ninety days.3 In addi-
tion, on repeated occasions, Long informed Pietraszek that service
had been made and any delay was a result of a court backlog.4 In
April 1992, the case was dismissed by the court, due to Long's fail-
ure to serve the defendants. 5 In April 1993, Long falsely advised
Pietraszek that the case was still pending.6 In November 1993,
Pietraszek contacted the court directly and learned that his case
had already been dismissed over a year and a half earlier.7 When
Pietraszek confronted Long, Long denied any knowledge that the
case had been dismissed." Pietraszek then retained counsel to sue
Long for malpractice.9
Second, James Farristall (Farristall) hired Long in a guardi-
anship matter that was filed by Albert McSweeney. 10 Approxi-
mately a week after Long filed an entry of appearance with the
court for Farristall in July 1996, a pretrial conference was sched-
uled for October 2, 1996.11 The order scheduling the conference
1. See In re Long, 755 A.2d 828, 829-30 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 829.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 829-30.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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provided that failure of either party to appear could result in an
immediate hearing on the matter.12 Though Long received the or-
der, he failed to give Farristall a copy and to tell him to appear at
the conference. 13 In September 1996, Long noted that his diary
indicated that he was to appear in court on October 2 for the "Mc-
Sweeney" matter. 14 However, not recognizing the name Mc-
Sweeney, Long disregarded the notice until the day before the
pretrial conference, when he called the court to determine the pur-
pose of the meeting. 15 At that time he realized the meeting per-
tained to the matter for which Farristall had retained him.' 6
When Long called Farristall, Farristall told Long he could not ap-
pear in court on such short notice because he would be fired for
missing work. Long stated that he would request a continuance.'
7
When Long requested the continuance, he misrepresented his rea-
son for making the request by stating he had a trial in another
court.' Long then provided further false information in response
to the judge's inquiry as to where the case was being heard.' 9
Though the continuance was granted, the judge called the court
where Long claimed he had a trial and learned that Long was not
scheduled to appear in that court.20 The judge then referred
Long's conduct to the Massachusetts Bar Counsel for disciplinary
action. 21
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Supreme Judicial Court of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts found that Long violated sev-
eral rules of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility in his representations of both Pietraszek and
Farristall. 22 Specifically, they found Long, in his representation of
Pietraszek, had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 23 DR 6-101(A)(3), 24 DR 7-
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980):
"A lawyer shall not: ... [eingage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation").
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101(A)(1) 2 5 , DR 7-101(A)(2) 26 and DR 7-101(A)(3). 27 In his repre-
sentations of Farristall, Long was found to have violated DR 1-
102(A)(4),28 DR 1-102(A)(5), 29 DR 1-102(A)(6), 30 DR 6-101(A)(3), 31
DR 7-101(A)(1), 3 2 DR 7-101(A)(2), 33 DR 7-101(A)(3) 34 and DR 7-
102(A)(5). 35
In May 2000 the Supreme Judicial Court of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts suspended Long from the practice of law
in Massachusetts and notified the Rhode Island Supreme Court
Disciplinary Counsel of that suspension. 36 The Supreme Court
Disciplinary Counsel then filed a petition with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for imposition of reciprocal discipline as Long is
also a member of the Rhode Island Bar.37 In June 2000, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court ordered that Long be suspended from prac-
ticing law in Rhode Island for three months.38
24. See id. at 830-31 (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 6-101(A)(3)
(1980): "A lawyer shall not: ... [nieglect a legal matter entrusted to him").
25. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980):
"A lawyer shall not intentionally:... [flail to seek the lawful objectives of his client
through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary
Rules . . .").
26. See id. (citing Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(2) (1980):
"A lawyer shall not intentionally:... [flail to carry out a contract of employment
entered into with a client for professional services .. ").
27. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(3) (1980):
"A lawyer shall not intentionally: ... [pirejudice or damage his client during the
course of the professional relationship ... ).
28. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR-1-102(A)(4) (1980)).
29. See id.. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(5) (1980):
"A lawyer shall not: ... [eingage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice").
30. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(6) (1980):
"A lawyer shall not: ... leingage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law").
31. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 6-101(A)(3) (1980)).
32. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980)).
33. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(2) (1980)).
34. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(3) (1980)).
35. See id. (citing Model Code of Profl Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980):
"In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: ... [kinowingly make a false
statement of law or fact").
36. See id. at 829.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
Though the Code of Professional Responsibility was
superceded by the Rules of Professional Conduct in Rhode Island
in 1988, most of the same principles are embodied by the present
rules.39 The court found that if the misconduct had occurred in
Rhode Island, the following rules would have been violated: rule
1.3,40 rule 3.2, 41 rule 8.4(C) 42 and rule 8.4(d).43
After it received the petition from the Supreme Court Discipli-
nary Counsel, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an order to
Long requiring that he inform the court of any reason why imposi-
tion of reciprocal sanctions was not warranted. 44 Pursuant to arti-
cle III, rule 14(d), the Rhode Island Supreme Court was required to
impose identical sanctions unless the record clearly demonstrated
that: 1) the attorney's right to due process was violated; 2) there
was a clear "infirmity" of proof of misconduct; 3) a "grave injustice"
would result; or 4) substantially different sanctions were
warranted.45
When Long appeared before the court on June 22, 2000, he
agreed to accept a suspension.46 Because there was no showing
that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed by the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court, the court ordered Long suspended from the
practice of law in the State of Rhode Island for ninety days begin-
ning June 26, 2000.4 7
39. See id. at 831.
40. See id. (citing S. Ct. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.3 (2000), "A lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client").
41. See id. (citing S. Ct. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 3.2 (2000), "A lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the
client").
42. See id. (citing S. Ct. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 8.4(c) (2000), "It is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").
43. See id. (citing S. Ct. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 8.4(d) (2000), "It is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to:... [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.").
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 831-32.
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CONCLUSION
This case involved an attorney admitted in both Rhode Island
and Massachusetts. The attorney was disciplined by the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court for conduct violating Massachu-
setts's code of responsibility for attorneys. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court determined that the attorney's conduct in Massa-
chusetts violated Rhode Island's own code of conduct. Accordingly,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court imposed identical reciprocal
sanctions, as there was no showing that this action was
unwarranted.
Ann B. Sheppard
